CVE-2025-12060:Keras: Arbitrary file write via archive extraction
A reconstruction of the flaw, and the evidence path Lachesis follows to make it visible.
With no family and no line seeded, the whole-taxonomy enumerator put 10 of its filesystem.path.containment leads inside keras/src/utils/file_utils.py (lines 123-522).
That is the shape of the failure. The rest of this case file follows the evidence behind it.
What was known.
What Lachesis established.
Known before Lachesis ran
The CVE and vulnerable release were selected from public history. We are not claiming novel discovery.
- CVE
- CVE-2025-12060
- Vulnerable target
- v3.11.3 (last-vulnerable; range <= 3.11.3) · vulnerable
- Prior knowledge
- CVE-2025-12060 · v3.11.3 (last-vulnerable; range <= 3.11.3) is vulnerable
Independent re-detection
The experiment graph was built around the last-vulnerable release (v3.11.3), scoped to keras/src/utils so the file-utils translation unit builds under the pass budget (build 11s, enrich 21499 nodes / 57470 edges), then enumerated BLIND over the whole constructor registry (no family hard-coded, no target line seeded). The census and candidate ids below are the enumerator's own verbatim output; prose in `adjudication`/`trace` is MY reading of the advisory + fix, clearly separated from tool output.
- Seeded inputs
- None
- Run timestamp
- 2026-09-03T00:00:00Z
- Evidence artifact
- cve-2025-12060.kuzu (built from Keras v3.11.3, scoped to keras/src/utils; graph + sidecars deleted after capture)
The commands and outputs below come from this recorded Lachesis run.
What Lachesis reconstructed.
One historical repository. Four captured queries. A complete source-to-sink argument.
Lachesis follows the same evidence path through unfamiliar repositories.
Here is how the path becomes visible.
These are the recorded questions Lachesis asked of the historical vulnerable code, followed by the raw result and source location each query returned.
Captured runA real replay of Lachesis over the graph we built for this case (build 11s under the pass cap, bounded memory). Every value below is verbatim captured tool output; the graph was released immediately after capture, so nothing accumulates.
Investigate the candidate
The narrowed scope builds the file-utils TU under the pass cap.
build rc=0 11s
enrich rc=0 :: pass2 published 21499 nodes and 57470 edgesA small line with a large consequence.
the extraction trusts tarfile's filter / filter_safe_paths() allowlist, which a long symlink chain bypasses, so an extracted member's final path can escape the destination directory.
# extract_archive extracts members without a containment guard that survives symlink resolution
// 3.12.0 extracts with filter="data" and robust per-member containment, closing the symlink-chain bypass.
The original record.
Read the historical advisory and vulnerability record behind this reconstruction.