CVE-2025-68664:langchain-core: Unsafe deserialization
A historical CVE, retraced through the questions Lachesis asks of vulnerable code.
Attacker-controlled serialized data was revived as a class, turning a data-loading path into object construction.
That is the shape of the failure. The rest of this case file follows the evidence behind it.
What was known.
What Lachesis established.
Known before Lachesis ran
The CVE and vulnerable release were selected from public history. We are not claiming novel discovery.
- CVE
- CVE-2025-68664
- Vulnerable target
- langchain-core==0.3.80 (affected: <0.3.81 and <1.2.5) · vulnerable
- Prior knowledge
- CVE-2025-68664 · langchain-core==0.3.80 (affected: <0.3.81 and <1.2.5) is vulnerable
Independent re-detection
The experiment graph was built around the vulnerable module (release langchain-core==0.3.80, libs/core/langchain_core/load/load.py), rather than starting from arbitrary langchain-core source. We did not point the tool at the CVE. Enumeration ran over the whole candidate registry (candidate_census across every family); injection.exec was not singled out, and Lachesis surfaced the Reviver load sink on its own. The sink, its CWE, and its rank were emitted by the tool; the sink was not fed from memory.
- Seeded inputs
- None
- Run timestamp
- 2026-08-24T12:06:09Z
- Evidence artifact
- ~/.lachesis/graphs/langchain_load.kuzu
The commands and outputs below come from this recorded Lachesis run.
What Lachesis reconstructed.
One historical repository. Four captured queries. A complete source-to-sink argument.
Lachesis follows the same evidence path through unfamiliar repositories.
Here is how the path becomes visible.
These are the recorded questions Lachesis asked of the historical vulnerable code, followed by the raw result and source location each query returned.
Captured runThis block reflects the real blind drive of the graph we built for langchain-core. We loaded the whole graph, listed every bug family with nothing chosen ahead of time, and the code injection sink came out of that. The handles, model tag and guard reading below are the facts captured on that drive on that drive. No attacker JSON was seeded; the finding was rediscovered from graph structure, so the mode is independent-redetection.
Load the graph and list every bug family
First we load the graph and ask the tool to list every bug family it knows, with nothing picked ahead of time. It reports all 8 domains and 31 sink constructors and says the census is complete for what the graph can observe. Injection is one row among all of them.
[lachesis-mcp] loaded the graph; overlay: 853 derived edges; dataflow tier: present
{"move": "load_graph", "graph": "/Users/riyandhiman/.lachesis/graphs/langchain_load.kuzu", "profile": "all"}
CANDIDATE_CENSUS
move: candidate_census
taxonomy (8):
domain=lifecycle title=Resource lifecycle enumerable=True
domain=memory title=Memory safety enumerable=True
domain=injection title=Injection enumerable=True
domain=navigation title=Request forgery & redirection enumerable=True
domain=object-integrity title=Object integrity enumerable=True
domain=filesystem title=Filesystem enumerable=True
domain=crypto-config title=Cryptography & transport config enumerable=True
domain=resource title=Resource exhaustion enumerable=True
constructors (31): complete_for_observable_graph=True
applied: TrueA small line with a large consequence.
The allowlist checks only the top-level package name, not the submodule, class, or kwargs. It does not stop object construction within an allowed package.
if namespace[0] not in self.valid_namespaces or namespace == ["langchain"]: raise ValueError
// The dumps() side did not escape user-controlled mapping keys beginning with 'lc', letting an attacker smuggle a crafted {"lc":1,"type":"constructor","id":[...],"kwargs":{...}} node that load()/loads() then revives -- importing a module by the attacker-influenced namespace path and instantiating the named class with attacker kwargs. Fixed 0.3.81/1.2.5 by escaping 'lc' keys on serialization and hardening the load defaults (secrets_from_env=False plus an explicit allowed-objects allowlist).The original record.
Read the historical advisory and vulnerability record behind this reconstruction.